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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Case No. 89-0384CA

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, appellant John Call Engineering, Inc. submits the
following additional authority that supplements Point I of
Appellant's Brief.
The Utah Supreme Court in Golding v. Ashley
Central Irrigation District, 133 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (April 23,
1990) ruled:
1)

That a responsive pleading must set forth any and
all applicable affirmative defenses;

2)

Any affirmative defense
pleading are waived; and

3)

A moving party is entitled to an order striking
any affirmative defenses not pled.

not

set

forth

A copy of the case is attached to this letter.
Sincerely,
ROBERT/J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

ROBERT J. DEBRY
RJD\jn
Enclosure
Paul R. Frischknecht
cc:
50 North Main Street
Manti, UT 84642
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Gerald GOLDING, individually, and as
representative of the heirs of Randal Golding,
deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
ASHLEY CENTRAL IRRIGATION
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 880025
FILED: April 23, 1990
Seventh District, Uintah County,
Honorable Dennis L. Draney
ATTORNEYS:
Richard I. Ashton, David A. Wilde, Murray,
for appellant
Clark B. Allred, Gayle F. McKeachnie,
Vernal, for appellee
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Gerald Golding appeals from the grant of a
motion by defendant Ashley Central Irrigation
Company for judgment on the pleadings and
the consequent dismissal of Golding's wrongful death action against the irrigation
company. Golding asserts that the trial court
erred in concluding (i) that the Limitation of
Landowner Liability Act ("the Act") applied
to the facts of this case, thereby shielding the
irrigation company from liability for negligence, and (ii) that the complaint did not adequately allege a "willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous condition"
on its property that would permit Golding to
recover under section 57-14-6 of the Act.
We conclude that the pleadings are insufficient
to demonstrate that the Act's protections are
available to the irrigation company. Therefore,
we reverse and remand to the trial court for
further proceedings.
The grant of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings is reviewed under the same standard
as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we
affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover
under the facts alleged. And in considering the
factual allegations in the complaint, we take
them as true and consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff. E.g., Lowe v.
Sorcmon Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669,
(Utah 1989); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First

Natl Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988).
The facts are stated here in accordance with
this standard of review. See, e.g., State v.
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989).
On June 25, 1986, Randal Golding, seventeen, and four teenaged friends went swimming in an irrigation canal owned by Ashley
Central Irrigation Company. There were no
warnings posted of any dangers posed by
swimming in the canal. While swimming, one
of the boys went over a spillway and became
trapped in the backwash created at the
bottom. Jumping in to save his friend, Randal
was caught in the backwash and swept under
the surface. He was found approximately 150
feet downstream from the spillway some
twenty minutes later. He died two days later.
Randal's father, Gerald Golding, filed an
action against the irrigation company in June
1987 for wrongful death. The complaint was
couched in negligence terminology and alleged
basically that the irrigation company failed to
properly maintain its waterways and post
warnings. The irrigation company answered in
July 1987, denying all claims and alleging as a
defense, inter alia, that the complaint "failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted." It then filed a motion for judgment
on the pleadings. As a ground for the motion,
the irrigation company raised for the first time
a claim that because the boys were using the
canal for recreational purposes, any cause of
action against the irrigation company sounding
in mere negligence was barred under the
Limitation of Landowner Liability Act. See
Utah Code Ann. §§57-14-1 to-7 (1986)
(amended in part 1987 & 1988).1 Golding filed
a memorandum in opposition, arguing that the
irrigation company could not claim the protection of the Act for a number of reasons, but
he did not raise the argument that the irrigation company had waived the defense of the
Act by not asserting it in its answer. Alternatively, Golding contended that even if the Act
were applicable, the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under
section 57-14-6(1) of the Act, which provides, "Nothing in this act limits in any way
any liability which otherwise exists ... for
willful or malicious failure to guard or warn
against a dangerous condition, use, structure,
or activity ...." Utah Code Ann. §57-14-6
(1986) (amended 1988).
The court granted the irrigation company's
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It held
that the Act applied and that Golding's
complaint did not allege a willful or malicious
failure to warn which would bring the action
under section 57-14-6. The case was
ordered dismissed. Golding appealed.
Before addressing the merits of the appeal,
we address the pleading and the procedure
that led to the ruling below, because it raises a
practice issue of general concern to the courts
and bar. Had Golding timely moved, he would
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have been entitled to an order striking that
portion of the motion for judgment on the
pleadings that relied on the Act as a defense to
any negligence claim. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b) provides that any defense
shall be asserted in a responsive pleading.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(c) provides that a responsive
pleading must set forth any matter
"constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense." And rule 12(h) provides that a party
"waives all defenses ... which [he or she] does
not present either by motion ... or ... in his
[or her] answer or reply ...." The Act certainly
constitutes an "affirmative defense" or an
"avoidance," inasmuch as it denies liability not
because the allegations of the complaint are
not true, but because the legislature is claimed
to have relieved the irrigation company of the
liability usually associated with negligence.
Therefore, to preserve the Act as a defense, it
had to be raised in the irrigation company's
answer. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken,
668 P.2d 493, 493-94 (Utah 1983); Utah R.
Civ. P. 8(c).
Here, defendant's responsive pleading was
its answer, and that pleading did not mention
the Act. It only asserted, in the general terms
of rule 12(b)(6), that the complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Although such a defense is commonly
pleaded in Utah as a matter of form and
counsel for the irrigation company may have
thought that by putting a 12(b)(6) statement in
the answer he had preserved the question of
the Act's applicability, such a generally
pleaded defense adds nothing to an answer
because it gives no notice of the substance of
the defense. See generally Utah R. Civ. P.
8(b), (c), (e). Therefore, because the irrigation
company did not properly preserve the Act as
a defense, it was waived and plaintiff was
entitled to object to its being raised in the
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
However, by not objecting, the plaintiff, in
turn, waived this defective mode of placing the
Act in issue. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d
496, 497 (Utah 1976). We therefore address
the question of the Act's applicability.
The Act's applicability can be determined
by reference to a decision of this court handed
down after completion of the briefing of the
instant appeal. In Crawford v. Tilley, 780
P.2d 1248 (Utah 1989), the trial court found
that the Act freed the owner of a cabin with a
negligently maintained wall heater from liability when sued by the parents of a young
hunter who had been asphyxiated. 2 The cabin
was located in a private development which
was not made available to the public for recreational use and had locked entry gates on
the roads but was not fenced or posted against
trespassing. The cabin owners contended that
under section 57-14-3 of the Act, owners of
any property are freed from a duty of ordi-
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nary care to recreational users to maintain
their property in a safe condition or warn of
hazards. We rejected this contention and held
that the Act was inapplicable under the Crawford facts.
In the Crawford opinion, we delved into the
background of the Act and found that the
purpose of these provisions and of the provisions in section 57-14-3 and 57-14-4 that
specifically limit the common law liability of a
landowner who "directly or indirectly invites
or permits" non-paying recreational use of its
land to any such recreational users is "to
promote the opening of private lands to public
recreational use." 780 P.2d at 1250-51. We
concluded that it would be inconsistent with
this purpose to extend the protections of the
Act to landowners "who actively discourage or
preclude public access to their property." Id.
Crawford, therefore, held that before a landowner could qualify for the limitations on
common law liability, it must show that it has
"made [its] property available to at least some
members of the general public for recreational
purposes." 780 P.2d at 1251; see Butler, Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 47, 71-76 [hereinafter Butler].
Turning to the present case, the district
court did not have the benefit of Crawford
when presented with the irrigation company's
motion. In granting that motion, the court
held only that the provisions of the Act were
applicable; it did not discuss the basis for that
determination. Because Crawford teaches that
the owner must have made the property available for recreational use to obtain the Act's
protection, and because the record contains no
evidence from which such a determination can
be made, the irrigation company has not
shown that it qualifies for the Act's limitations on liability. The district court's decision
on the Act's applicability must be reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings
on that question under the guidance of Crawford.
Should the trial court find the Act applicable, it will have to address the question of
whether the allegations of the complaint are
sufficient to satisfy section 57-14-6's preservation of liability for willful or malicious
conduct. Because the issue has been fully
briefed here and may well be presented on
remand, we will discuss the trial court's
finding that Golding's complaint contained no
allegation of "willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against any condition existing
in, on or about the canal." Such a step is
appropriate under our rules. R. Utah S. Ct.
30(a); see Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024,
1026 (Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of
County Comm'rs, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah
1979); Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City,
570 P.2d 119, 121 (Utah 1977); Lopes v.
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Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687,
688 (1974); LcGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, 18 Utah 2d 260, 263, 420 P.2d 615, 617
(1966).
We have not had occasion to construe
section 57-14-6 or to determine what is
necessary to satisfy its requirements. The
leading article on the Utah Act says that
analogous provisions in other similar state acts
have often been referred to as imposing a duty
on landowners toward recreational users
falling under the statute that is "analogous to
a landowner's duty toward an unknown trespasser at common law." Butler, at 95. In Ewell
v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 1291 (D.
Utah 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.
1985), the federal district court addressed the
Utah Act. While it did not address the duty
imposed by Utah trespass law, it did note that
one reading we had given to the terms "willful
misconduct" and "willful and malicious" in
other contexts was "'the intentional failure to
do an act, with knowledge that serious injury
is the probable result.'" Id. at 1295 (quoting
Brown v. Frandsen, 19 Utah 2d 116, 117, 426
P.2d 1021, 1022 (1967)) (defining "willful
misconduct"). Another reading we have given
the terms noted is "'such gross neglect of duty
as to evince a reckless indifference of the
rights of others on the part of the wrongdoer,
and an entire want of care so as to raise the
presumption that the person at fault is conscious of the consequences of his carelessness.'" Id. at 1295-96 (quoting Clayton v.
Crossroads Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1131
(Utah 1982)) (dictum relying on non-Utah
sources equating "willful and malicious" with
"gross negligence" or "reckless indifference").
But see At kin Wright & Miles v. Mountain
States Tel. and Tel. Co., 709 P.2d 330, 335
(Utah 1985) (dictum defining "willful misconduct" as one step beyond "gross negligence,"
which is defined as "reckless indifference," in
that "a defendant must be aware that his
conduct will probably result in injury"). The
federal court also noted that Prosser describes
"willful or wanton misconduct" as "an aggravated form of negligence, different in quality
rather than degree from ordinary lack of
care." Id. at 1296 (quoting W. Prosser, Law
of Torts §34, at 184 (4th ed. 1971)). The
federal district court did not attempt to reconcile any conflict in the Utah cases, but simply
found the complaint insufficient to allege the
degree of "intent, knowledge or reckless indifference ... of any dangerous condition" required by section 57-14-6.
According to Butler, the standard quoted by
the federal court from Brown v. Frandsen,
which incorporates the elements of knowledge
of the dangerous condition and of the fact
that serious injury is a probable result, and
inaction in the face of such knowledge, is
consistent with Utah case law, with the Act's
legislative history, and with the decisions of a

5

majority of courts that has addressed analogous recreational use statutes. Butler, at 9596. We also note that it is consistent with our
statement in Atkin Wright & Miles and not
obviously inconsistent with the general law
regarding the duties of a landowner to trespassers, which has never been spelled out in
Utah in great detail. See, e.g., Tjas v. Proctor,
591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 1979); Stevens v. Salt
Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P.2d 496
(1970); In re Wimmer's Estate, 111 Utah 444,
182 P.2d 119 (1947); Zillman, Utah Tort Law
40-42 (1987). We, therefore, are inclined to
adopt the interpretation of the term "willful or
malicious" in section 57-14-6 suggested by
Butler.
Applying that standard to the facts of the
instant case, we conclude that these three elements are not alleged. Paragraph 11(e) states:
Defendant breached the duty of
care owed to Plaintiff and was
negligent in at least the follow [sic]
particulars!:]
... ,
(e) in failing to take reasonable
action to protect the public in the
face of knowledge and information
that its canals, ditches, spillways
and waterways were unreasonably
dangerous to life and limb ....
Nothing in the quoted allegations avers a
knowledge of a dangerous condition, a knowledge that serious injury is the probable
result of contact with the condition, or a
failure to take any action in the face of this
knowledge. Golding's allegation is only of a
failure to take "reasonable" action to protect
the public in the face of knowledge of an
unreasonably dangerous condition. This is an
allegation of negligence only.3 Therefore, if
the Act is found to apply here, the allegations
of the complaint, as presently framed, are
insufficient to bring it within section 57-146.
On the other hand, if the trial court finds
that the Act does not apply because the property was not made available by the irrigation
company for public recreation by directly or
indirectly inviting or permitting that use, the
court must then determine whether the complaint alleges a common law cause of action
for negligence, an issue that has not been
briefed and to which we see no reason to
speak.
We reverse and remand to the trial court to
determine the Act's applicability and to
proceed further in accordance with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result.
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57-14-3. Owner owes no duty of care
or to give warning-Exceptions.
Except as specifically provided in
Subsections (1) and (2) of §57-14-6,
an owner of land owes no duty of care
to keep the premises safe for entry or
use by any person using the premises for
any recreational purpose, or to give any
warning of a dangerous condition, use,
structure, or activity on those premises
to those persons. 57-14-4. Owner's
permitting another to use land without
charge-Effect.
Except as specifically provided in
Subsection (1) of §57-14-6, an owner
of land who either directly or indirectly
invites or permits without charge any
person to use the land for any recreational purpose does not thereby:
(1) make any representation or extend
any assurance that the premises are safe
for any purpose;
(2) confer upon the person the legal
status of an invitee or licensee to whom
a duty of care is owed;
(3) assume responsibility for or incur
liability for any injury to persons or
property caused by an act or omission
of the person or any other person who
enters upon the land; or
(4) owe any duty to curtail his [or her)
use of his [or her] land during its use for •
recreational purposes.
57-14-6. Liability not limited where
willful or malicious conduct involved or
admission fee charged.
Nothing in this act limits in any way
any liability which otherwise exists:
(1) for willful or malicious failure to
guard or warn against a dangerous
condition, use, structure, or activity or
for deliberate, willful, or malicious
injury to persons or property ....
U t a h C o d e A n n . § § 5 7 - 1 4 - 1 t o - 6 (1986)
(amended in part 1987 & 1988).
2. The trial court's decision in Crawford was the
subject of a lengthy and scholarly law review article.
See Butler, Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis
of Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. Rev.
47.
3. It is worth noting that this allegation would not
be sufficient, even under the weaker "reckless disregard" standard of Clayton v. Crossroads Equipmem Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982).
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1. These sections provide in pertinent part:
57-14-1. Legislative purpose.
The purpose of this act is to encourage owners of land to make land and
water areas available to the public for
recreational purposes by limiting their
liability toward persons entering thereon
for those purposes.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS & DICK'S LUMBER A N D
H A R D W A R E , a Utah corporation,
Petitioner,
v.
TAX COMMISSION of the State of Utah,
Respondent.
N o . 880188
FILED: April 24, 1990
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
R. L a M a r Bishop, Salt Lake City, for
petitioner
R. P a u l Van D a m , Stephen G. Schwendiman,
Bryce H . Pettey, Salt Lake City, for
respondent
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
Z I M M E R M A N , Justice:
Chris & Dick's L u m b e r and H a r d w a r e ,
Inc., seeks a writ of review of a final decision
of the U t a h State Tax Commission ordering
Chris & Dick's to pay a 10 percent penalty,
plus interest, on over $90,000 due on an untimely filed prepayment of sales tax return.
Chris & Dick's claims that the penalty was
improperly assessed under the terms of section
59-15-5.1 of the code or, alternatively, that
the language of the statute is so vague as to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth a m e n d m e n t of the United States Constitution. W e affirm.
Section 59-15-5.1 of the code requires
certain entities to prepay a portion of their
state and local sales tax liability by June 15th.
Utah Code Ann. §59-15-5.1
(1985)
( c u r r e n t v e r s i o n at § 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 8 ( S u p p .
1989)). Chris & Dick's, through its accountant, filed its prepayment return thirty-eight
days late. T h e Utah State Tax Commission
levied a 10 percent penalty against Chris &
D i c k ' s u n d e r section 59-15-5.1(3), which
provides in pertinent part: "In addition to any
other penalties for late payment provided in
Section 59-15-5, there shall be a penalty of
10% of the total a m o u n t of the prepayment
due from the date the prepayment return is
d u e . " U t a h Code A n n . §59-15-5.1 (1985)
( c u r r e n t version at §59-12-108 ( S u p p .
1989)). 1 This penalty was ultimately determined to be $9,287, plus interest. Upon Chris &
Dick's m o t i o n for a formal hearing, the
commission affirmed the penalty in April
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Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
RE:

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City
Case No. 89-0384CA

Dear Clerk:
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of the
Appellate Procedure, appellant John Call Engineering, Inc.
submits the following additional authority.
The additional
authority supplements Point III of Appellant's Reply Brief
Argument.
A motion in limine is a motion requesting the Court to
prohibit opposing counsel from referring to or offering evidence
so highly prejudicial to the moving party that curative
instructions cannot prevent the predispositional effect on the
jury.
Messier v. Simmon's Gun Specialties Inc., 687 P.2d 121
(Okla. 1984).
The motion also avoids juror bias generated by
objection to the prejudicial evidence at trial. Davidson v. Beco
Corp., 733 P.2d 781, 784 (Idaho App. 1986).
The motion recognizes that the mere asking of
an improper question in the hearing of the
jury may
prove
so prejudicial 'that,
notwithstanding an instruction by the court
to disregard the offensive matter, the moving
party will be denied his right to a fair
trial.
It is the prejudicial effect of the
questions
asked
or statement
made
in
connection with the offer of evidence and not
so much the prejudicial effect of the
evidence itself, that this very practical
tool was designed to reach.
Gendron v. Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co., 409 A.2d 656, 659 (Me.
1979) .

Utah Court of Appeals
May 15, 1990
Page Two
A motion in limine should be granted when two factors
are present: 1) the evidence is inadmissable; and 2) the offer,
reference or statements made during trial concerning the evidence
will tend to prejudice the jury. Whittley v. City of Meridian,
530 So.2d 1341 (Miss. 1988). State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845, 84748 (Wash. 198]).
See, Caserta v. Allstate Insurance Co., 470
N.E.2d 430, 434-35 (Ohio App. 1983).
Sincerely,
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

HeROBERT J. DEBRY
RJD\jn
cc: Counsel of record
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:h o
of contract

6

D.
POINT II

The lower court'
court's fai!Lure to
mandate is reversible error,

always
follow

an
the

CALL DID NOT HAVE NOTICE THAT MANTI
WOULD BE ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS ANSWER
TO INCLUDE MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AS
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

A.

Introduction

B.

The record
in this case conclusively
establishes that Call did not have notice
that Manti would seek to try the mitigation
of damages affirmative defense.

C.

Call was prejudiced.

POINT III

B.

C.

THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
LOWER COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND
ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY

11

Introduction

11

The record shows that Manti presented
false, irrelevant, and prejudicial issues
and arguments to the jury.
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Conclusion
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III.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT

I

-

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DID NOT DIRECT THE TRIAL
COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER CALL MITIGATED ITS
DAMAGES

The mandate of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti
City

Corporation,

743

P.2d

1205f

1210

(Utah

1987) was

M

to

determine plaintiff's damages and enter judgment in favor of
Call."

Id.

The majority opinion did not instruct the lower

court to determine whether Call mitigated his damages.

Only a

two judge minority concurring opinion suggested that mitigation
of damages was an issue.
to the lower court.
views.

A concurring opinion is no direction

It is

only an expression of minority

McGowan v. University of Scranton, 759 F.2d 287 (3d.

Cir. 1985).
POINT II

-

CALL DID NOT HAVE NOTTCE THAT MANTI WOULD RE
ALLOWED
TO AMEND
ITS ANSWER
TO
INCLUDE
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The record establishes that Call had no notice that
Manti

would

be

allowed

affirmative defense.
damages.

Manti

to

try

the

mitigation

of

damages

The first trial did not try mitigation of

never

filed

a motion

to

amend

its answer.

Manti did not include any mitigation of damages issue in the
pre-trial order.
POINT III

-

THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE LOWER COURT ALLOWED
MANTI TO PRESENT IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY

The record establishes that the lower court allowed
1

Manti to inject the following false and prejudicial issues into
the trial:
1.

The contract was in dispute, when in fact, the

Utah Supreme Court ruled that the only issue was Call' s damages .
2.

Call

was

paid

for

everything

he

did,

so

he

should not be able to recover lost profits.
3.

Call could

not proceed without written autho-

rity, an argument rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in this
very case.
4.

The taxpayers would have to pay Call.

The lower court did not grant Call's Motion in Limine, nor sustain the majority of Call's objections.

The Court

also failed to instruct the jury to disregard the arguments.
POINT IV

-

THE LOWER COURT, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF CALL,
FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO CALCULATE
LOST PROFITS

In this case, Call submitted three jury instructions
and a special verdict to tell the jury that lost profits

were

calculated by determining gross receipts that would have been
earned and subcontracting expenses saved by not performing the
contract.
special

The Court rejected

verdict.

Call' s

the jury instructions

legal

theory

of

presented to the jury in a jury instruction.

2

damages

and the
was

not

POINT V

-

FROM THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL, IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE FOR RATIONAL MINDS TO CALCULATE
CALL'S LOST PROFITS AT LESS THAN $56,000

Manti did not call any witnesses.

Callfs expert wit-

ness testified that Call's lost profits were $136,334.
The time records of the engineer who replaced Call
multiplied by Call's contract rates establishes the gross receipts.

Call testified about the expenses he saved.

Call

testified that his damages were more than $106,00 but somewhat
less than $183,846.
Averaging Call's profit margins taken from his financial record establishes lost profits of $70,278.
Multiplying the gross receipts by the profit margin
of the engineer who replaced Call establishes lost profits of
$56,377.60.

It is impossible to rationally

calculate damages

in a lesser amount.
POINT VI

-

THERE IS NOT ONE IOTA OF TRIAL EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT MANTI'S MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Manti, in its brief, fails to cite to the record one
iota

of

damages.

evidence

to establish

that Call did not mitigate

Manti has the burden of proof to establish the

mitigation of damages affirmative defense.
All witnesses called were Call's witnesses.

Not one

of the witnesses furnished any evidence suggesting that Call
did not mitigate his damages.

3

POINT VII

-

UNLESS CALL IS AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEE
COSTSf HE DOES NOT HAVE A REMEDY FOR MANTI'S
BREACH, AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 11
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION

Article If Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guarantees to Call "a remedy by due course of law which shall be
administered without denial

..."

Call's case required

expert testimony

to

establish

lost profits. Expert testimony does not come cheap.

Unless

Call is awarded his expert witness costs, Call has no effective
legal remedy for Manti's

breach.

The lower court recognized

that Call should be awarded his expert witness fee costs.
You can argue that my personal feeling
[Judge Tibbs] is expert witness fees in a
reasonable rate ought to be allowed.
(Tr. p. 32

line 25, p. 33, line 1.)
VI.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

A.

-

THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT FOLLOW THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S
MANDATE. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT DID NOT DIRECT
THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER CALL
MITIGATED HIS DAMAGES

Introduction.
Manti alleges that the trial court expressly followed

"the directions of the Supreme Court by considering mitigation
evidence"

because

"when damages

are at

always a factor to be considered."
citing no authority.)
4

issue, mitigation

is

(Respondent's brief, p. 9,

Manti is clearly wrong.
not

direct

the

trial

court

to

damages, affirmative defense.

The Utah Supreme Court did
consider

the

mitigation

of

Further, the Utah Supreme Court

has ruled that mitigation of damages is not always a factor to
be considered when damages are the issue.
B.

The Utah Supreme Court did not direct the trial court to
consider whether Call mitigated his damages.
The mandate of John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti

City Corp. , 743 P.2d

1205, 1210 (Utah 1987) was "to determine

plaintiff's damages, and enter judgment in favor of Call."
No directions were given to the trial court to try
any mitigation of damages affirmative defense.
opinion

of

efforts

should be evaluated with reasonable care."

1210.

two

justices

said

that

A concurring

"plaintiff's

mitigation
Call at

However, a minority concurring opinion is not a mandate

and it is no direction to the lower court.
by a concurring opinion.
653 (Wyo. 1969).

Nothing is decided

Boode v. Allied Mutual Co., 458 P.2d

A concurring opinion is not the opinion of

the appellate court unless it is joined in by a majority of the
appellate judges.

State v. Dowe, 352 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1984).

In summary, the concurring opinion is only an expression of
views by a minority of the court and nothing more.
University of Scranton, 759 F.2d

287

McGowan v.

(3d. Cir. 1985).

Rule 30(c) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court;
Any
justice concurring
or
dissenting
therefrom may likewise give his reasons in
5

c. f.

writing and file the same with the clerk.
In

short,

the

notion

that

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

directed the trial court to try an unpled mitigation of damages
affirmative defense is sheer nonsense.
C.

Mitigation of damages is not always an issue in breach of
contract cases.
Without citation to any authority whatsoever, Manti

argues

that the

mandate

because

lower court
"when

always a factor."

followed the Utah Supreme Court

damages

are

at

issue, mitigation

is

(Respondent's brief, p. 9 ) .

Manti's unsupported argument is contrary to Utah law
in the following particulars:
1.

Mitigation of damages is only an issue, when it

is affirmatively, pled.
1986).

Gill v. Timm,

720 P.2d

1352

(Utah

In this case, Manti never pled mitigation of damages.
2.

Several Utah Supreme Court cases have held that

mitigation of damages is not an issue in a particular contract
case.
P.2d

See Hector, Inc. v. United Savings & Loan Ass'n., 741
542

(Utah 1987); Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah

1982); Double D. Amusement Co. v. Hawkins, 438 P.2d 811

(Utah

1968) .
3.

In

only

one

case

has

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

applied the mitigation of damages affirmative defense to a lost
profits case.

In Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox,

627 P. 2d 62 (1981), the Utah Supreme Court held that a turkey
6

grower voluntarily closed his business and, therefore, could
not seek lost profits from a lender who reneged on a loan.
Utah Farm Production Credit
stayed in business.

is a far cry from this case.

He did not voluntarily quit anything.

Call
In

a case like Call, the measure of damages is determined by the
difference between gross receipts and the expenses which would
have been incurred in earning the receipts.

Mitigation of

damages is not an issue.
D.

The lower court's failure to follow the mandate is reversible error.
When a judgment is rendered and remanded with special

instructions, (as was the case in Call) , the lower court is
bound to follow those instructions.

Hidden Development Co. v.

Miles, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979).
POINT II

A.

-

CALL DID NOT HAVE NOTICE THAT MANTI WOULD BE
ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS ANSWER TO INCLUDE MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Introduction.
Manti,

in

its

brief,

argues

that

Call

was

not

prejudiced by the court allowing Manti to amend its answer
because Call had notice that mitigation of damages was a trial
issue.
B.

Manti's argument is contrary to the record.

The record in this case conclusively establishes that
Call did not have notice that Manti would seek to try
the mitigation of damages affirmative defense.
Any examination of the record of this case conclusively

establishes that Call did not have notice that Manti would at7

tempt to try mitigation of damages.

Manti's answer to plain-

tiff's

mitigation

complaint

does

not

plead

of

damages.

Further, Call submitted comprehensive interrogatories to Manti
to discover the factual basis for Manti's affirmative defenses.
The answers, copies attached in the addendum, show no indication whatsoever that Manti would seek to try the affirmative
defense of mitigation of damages.

The record also reveals that

Manti did not attempt to amend its pleadings prior to the first
trial.
The first trial occurred in April of 1984.
on a complete case including damages.

Call put

An examination of the

trial transcript reveals that Manti did not try mitigation of
damages.

Manti

did not ask any mitigation of damages ques-

tions on direct or in cross-examination.
For the second trial, Judge Tibbs ordered the parties
to prepare and

file a pre-trial order.

The parties did so.

The pre-trial order, copy attached in the addendum, shows that
mitigation of damages was not a trial issue.
The
Still

second

trial

commenced

on

January

13,

1989.

Manti made no motion to amend its answer.
Prior

to

trial, Call

made

a motion

exclude evidence of mitigation of damages.

in

limine

to

Manti had not moved

to amend its answer and Call was not willing to let mitigation
of damages be tried by Call's express or implied consent pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b).
8

The court chose

to hear Call's Motion in Limine after the jury was impanelled.
Only after the court heard and denied Call's Motion in Limine
did Manti move to amend its answer by alleging the mitigation
of damages affirmative defense.

(Tr.p. 72.)

In short, from the first day of the litigation until
after the jury was impaneled, neither the pleadings, the responses

to discovery

nor the pre-trial order placed Call on

any notice whatsoever that Manti would try the mitigation of
damages affirmative defense.
C.

Call was prejudiced.
Call's opening brief, cites to the record wherein the

court and Manti's

counsel effectively

acknowledged that Call

was prejudiced by the court's injection of the mitigation of
damages defense into the trial.
Manti, responds that Call was not prejudiced because
Manti's strategy was to rely on cross examination rather than
calling its own witnesses. (Brief of respondent, p. 14.)
Manti's brief misses the point.

As shown in Point VI

of this brief, Manti failed to meet its burden of proof that
Call failed to mitigate his damages.
diced

because

the

court,

by

However, Call was preju-

allowing

the

allowed Manti to argue mitigation of damages
argument (Tr. p. 83).

amendment,

also

in its opening

The Court followed up with a confusing

jury instruction telling the jury that Call had a duty to cut
his losses.

(Jury instruction No. 21.)
9

In

summary,

1.

Manti

Call

was

prejudiced

in

the

following

ways :
argued

to

the

jury

that

Call

did

not

mitigate his damages, even though no evidence was submitted by
Manti either directly or on cross examination that Call did not
mitigate damages.
2.

The court, over the objection of Call (Tr. 306)

told the jury that Call had

a duty to cut his losses.

jury instruction lacked a factual basis.

The

c.f. Powers v. Gene's

Building Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977).
3.

Because the amendment was not sought nor granted

until after the impanelling of the jury, neither Call nor his
witnesses were prepared to try the mitigation of damages issue.
This case cries out for reversal. If it is not reversed, any defendant, after a jury is impanelled, can seek to
amend

his

defense.
defense
Civil

answer

by

alleging

a new undisclosed

affirmative

And if the judge grants the motion, the affirmative
will

be

Procedure

tried,
15(b)

despite
allows

the

trial

fact

that

amendments

express or implied consent of the parties.

Utah
only

Rule

of

by

the

In this case, Call

did not consent to trying any mitigation of damages defense.

10

POINT III

A.

-

THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
LOWER COURT ALLOWED MANTI TO PRESENT
IRRELEVANT AND PREJUDICIAL ISSUES AND
ARGUMENTS TO THE JURY

Introduction.
At

trial and prior

to the taking of testimony, Call

made a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence and argument on two irrelevant and prejudicial issues:

(1) whether

Call should be paid for work not performed; and (2) whether the
judgment could be paid out of the taxpayers' pockets.
trial court denied the motion but stated
objections.

The

it would sustain

(Tr. p.22, 67, 71.)

The trial court's denial of the Motion in Limine invited Manti to inject prejudicial arguments and issues into
the trial.

Manti accepted the invitation, arguing:
1.

The contract was in dispute when, in fact, the

Utah Supreme

Court had held that the only issue was Call's

damages.
2.

Call was paid for everything he did so he should

not recover lost profits.
3.

Call could not proceed without written authori-

ty; an argument rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.
4.

The taxpayers would have to pay Call's judgment.

Manti argues that Call's allegations are baseless and
that no damage was done because the lower court sustained
Call's objections.

Manti is wrong on both counts.

11

B.

The record shows that Manti presented falser irrelevant,
and prejudicial issues and arguments to the jury,

1.

The "contract was in dispute" issue.
In Manti's opening statement, Manti's counsel argued

to the jury that the contract was in dispute.
This contract that's in dispute, folks is
one that goes back to May of 1981.
(Tr. p. 79, lines 15-16.)
The
Call

established

engineering
up

foregoing

to

the

that

argument
Manti

and

was

Call

services; that Call had
time

of Manti's

false

breach;

had

and
a

prejudicial.
contract

satisfactorily
and

for

performed

that Manti, without

excuse, breached the engineering service contract with Call by
hiring another engineer.

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti

City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987).
Contrary to Manti's brief, the trial court did not
sustain Call's objection to the foregoing remarks.
Well its preliminary. I think it's preliminary to put the parties in the respective
positions.
The objection is overruled.
(Tr. p. 80, lines 10-12.)
2.

The "Call was paid for everything he did" issue.
In Manti's opening statement, Manti's counsel stated:
Mr. Call investigated and prepared a design
for a sewer system in Manti and was paid
the $22,000 . . . was paid for that
service.

(Tr.

p. 81, lines 1-4.)

12

After the design stage was completed by Mr.
Call and he was paid approximately $22,000,
Mr. Call provided no further engineering
services to Manti City.
(Tr. p. 82,

line 35; p. 83 lines 1-2.)

The foregoing statements were prejudicial because the
message to the jury was that Call had been paid for everything
he did, so he was not damaged.
Utah law which provides
Cook Associates v.
3.

The "Call
issue.

for an award of lost profits.

e.g.

Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983).

could

During

Such an argument is contrary to

not

the

proceed

cross

without

examination

written
of

authority"

Call,

Manti's

counsel, relying on a clause in the contract, attempted to show
to the jury that Call Engineering would not perform services
without written authority.
Q.

You wouldn't do it [any right of way
work] unless you got together with
Manti and had specific written authorization?

(Tr. p. 210, lines 11-13.)
Q.

[S]urveying couldn't be done without
written authorization from Manti City
either, could it?

(Tr. 210, lines 19-20.)
Q.

[Referring to the contract addendum]
[d]o you get that from this provision
of the contract, the middle paragraph
that says: "the engineer will not
proceed with additional phases of the
project until authorization from the
Owner?"

(Tr. p. 212, lines 9-12.)
13

The foregoing quotes were prejudicial, irrelevant and
planted false ideas with the jury.

During the first trial and

appeal, Manti took the position that Call could not proceed
without written authorization.

That argument was forcefully

rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in Call I;
The addendum did not provide a reason
whereby Manti City could choose to proceed
with the project avoid the valid agreement
and hire another engineer.
Call at 1209.
Again, contrary to Manti's brief, the trial court did
not sustain Call's objections.
Mr. Gardiner: Objection, Your Honor. The
Utah Supreme Court has already construed
that contract provision . . . and Mr.
Frischknecht knows that.
The Court: I don't know what it is. May I
see it please?
Mr. Gardiner:
I direct the Court to the
Utah Supreme Court's opinion on that very
issue.
The Court: Well, the objection is noted and
overruled.
(Tr. p. 211, lines 1-11.)
4.

The "Taxpayer would have to pay Call" issue.
In closing arguments, Manti's counsel told the jury

that taxpayers would have to pay any judgment awarded to Call.
(Tr. p. 318,

lines 10-16.)

Call's counsel quickly objected.

14

Your Honor, I object to this.
This
prejudicial.
It's an absolute appeal
the taxpayers' prejudice in this case,

is
to

(Tr. p. 318, lines 13-16.)
The
Court did

court

sustained

not tell the

the

objection.

However,

the

jury that they were not to consider

whether the judgment was to be paid from the taxpayers' pocket.
The objection is sustained.
Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, Manti City is the
defendant in this action. Not you.
(Tr. p. 318, lines 17-19.)
The Court's failure to properly admonish the jury is
reversible error.

Annot. Counsel's Appeal in Civil Case to

Self-interest or Prejudice of Jurors as Taxpayers, as a Ground
for Mistrial, New Trial or Reversal, 93 A.L.R.3d 556 (1979.)
C.

Conclusion.
Contrary to Manti's responding brief, Call's allega-

tion that Manti's counsel injected irrelevant and prejudicial
issues into the trial are not baseless.

Further, the court did

not sustain the objections and admonish the jury as to the true
facts and correct legal principles involved. The Court's failure to do so is reversal error.
POINT TV

-

THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE LOWER
COURT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HOW TO
CALCULATE LOST PROFITS.

In this case,

Call

sought

lost profits

resulting

from Manti's breach of the engineering services contract.
Lost

profits

are determined
15

by computing

the dif-

ference between
ceived

but

the gross receipts

for the

breach,

less

having to perform the contract,

that would have been re-

the expenses

saved

Cook Associates v.

by

not

Warnick,

664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); Acculoq, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d
728 (Utah 1984); Sawyers v. FMA Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986).
Call

submitted

two

proposed

jury

instructions

to

assist the jury in calculating lost profits, instructions No.
8, and No. 12.
Instruction No. 8 told the jury the contract rates
Manti agreed to pay Call for services rendered.
the rates and multiplying
earned

Only by taking

them by the hours Call would have

on the contract, could the jury determine the gross

receipts,
profits.

the

first

element

requisite

to

determining

lost

The Court refused the instruction.
Call also submitted jury instruction no. 12 and amen-

ded jury instruction No. 12.
Utah

Supreme

Court's

These instructions set forth the

formula

for

calculating

lost

profits.

These jury instructions were also rejected by the Court.
Manti's brief argues that the instructions taken as a
whole were adequate.

(Respondent's brief, p. 16.)

Manti's assertion is nonsense.

For jury instructions

to be adequate, the applicable principle of law must correctly
be presented to the jury in a clear and understandable manner.
Wellman v. Noble, 12 U.2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (Utah 1961).
court

is

required

to

instruct

the
16

jury on

The

how to measure

damages and to tell the jury the elements for which damages can
be awarded.

Judd v. Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchard, Inc., 611

P.2d 1216 (Utah 1980); City of Phoenix v. Wade, 428 P.2d 450
(Ariz. App. 1967); c.f.

Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah

1982) .
The jury instructions, without Call's proposed instructions 8, 12, and special verdict form, provided no assistance to the jury on how to calculate the lost profits.

The

jury instructions also failed to present Call's damage legal
theory.

The failure to give the instructions was reversible

error requiring a new trial.

Startin v. Madsen, 237 P. 2d 834

(1951); Hardman v. Thurman, 239 P.2d 215 (1951).
POINT V

-

In
profits

FROM THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AT TRIAL, IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE FOR RATIONAL MINDS TO CALCULATE
CALL'S DAMAGES AT LESS THAN $56,000
this

action,

Call

seeks

lost

profits.

Lost

may be established by:
1.

Expert opinions.

Cook Associates v. Warnick,

664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1983); or
2.

Evidence of gross receipts that would have been

received less expenses that would have been incurred. Acculog,
Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728 (Utah 1984); Sawyers v. FMA
Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986); or
3.
owner.

Records

Cook, supra.

evidence.

and

testimony

Call

put

on

of

a

all

similar
three

business
types

of

Each type of evidence shows that Call sustained
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damages of at least $56,000.

Manti put on no evidence to rebut

Call' s evidence. (Tr. p. 315-316.)
directed

verdict

verdict.

Both motions were denied.
In

and

for

Call ' s

a

judgment

opening

Manti

subtracting

responded

$22,000 paid

by

notwithstanding

brief,

impossible to rationally calculate
$56,000.

Call made a motion for a

Call

argued

the

it

was

lost profits of less than

taking

the

$56,000

figure and

to Call, for previous work.

Manti

then says the jury could have found that Call did not mitigate
his damages, so the $13,440 verdict is justified. (Respondent's
brief p.22.)
There

are

two

problems

with

Manti's

hypothesis.

First, the $22,000 cannot be deducted from the $56,000.

Call

contracted with Manti to do an engineering service contract.
The

first

report.

phase

$56,000

the

Call at 1207.

$22,000.
Thurgood

of

Thurgood
completed
figure

was

contract

for

a

preliminary

Call completed phase I and was paid

Engineering

the

called

other

obtained

was

phases
by

then

hired

of

the

taking

the

by

contract.
gross

Manti.
The

receipts

(Call's contract rate times Thurgood's hours) and multiplying
it by Thurgood's profit margin.

There is no rational reason

for deducting the $22,000 Call was paid for work not duplicated
by the replacement engineer.
There is also no rational reason for deducting any
amount

for

failure

to

mitigate
18

damages.

More

importantly,

there is no evidence to support any made-up deduction.

See

Point VI of this Brief,
In

summary,

the

unimpeached

and

uncontroverted

evidence shows that Call's lost profits cannot be less than
$56,000.
POINT VI

-

THERE IS NOT ONE IOTA OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
MANTI'S MITIGATION OF DAMAGES AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE

With little or no citation to the record, the theme
of

Respondent's

Brief

is

that

the

jury

mitigation of damages affirmative defense.
Brief p. 22.)
surprising.

accepted

Manti fs

(e.g. Respondent's

Manti's failure to cite to the record is not

There is nothing in the record supporting a miti-

gation of damages affirmative defense.
Mitigation of damages is, pure and simple, an affirmative defense.

Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986); Pratt

v. Board of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).
The affirmative defense burden of proof is on the
party asserting it.

It is up to the defendant to prove that a

plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages.

Pratt v. Board of

Utah County School District, 564 P.2d 294 (Utah 1977).

The

defendant must prove each and every fact material to his affirmative defense.

Pacific Insurance Co. of New York v. Frank,

452 P.2d 794 (Okla. 1969); Wendell v. Foley, 594 P.2d 750 (N.M.
App. 1979).
In this case, Manti freely admits it did not call any
19

witnesses nor present any evidence of its own on the mitigation
of damages issue.

It relied solely on cross examination.

[I]nstead of producing numerous witnesses
or evidence of its own regarding mitigation, Respondent's trial strategy relied on
cross examination of appellant's own witnesses .
(Respondent's Brief p. 14.)
However, a review of the trial transcript shows that
Manti failed to present any evidence, on cross examination, or
otherwise, that Call failed to mitigate his damages.

Mitiga-

tion of damages means only that:
[Tjhe aggrieved party [to a contract] may
not, either by action or inaction aggravate
the injury occasioned by the breach, but
has a duty to actively mitigate his
damages.
Utah Farm Production Credit Assoc, v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah
1981); see Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 P.2d
772

(Utah

1983);

DeBry

& Hilton

Travel v. Capitol

Interna-

tional Airways, 583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978).
In this case, there is no evidence that Call aggravated the injury either by action or inaction.
The witnesses called at trial were:
David Thurgood

-

The

engineer

hired

by Manti

to

replace Call.
Randy Peterson

-

Charles Peterson John Call Manti' s

counsel

Call's CPA.
Call's economic consultant; and
Principal of Call Engineering.
did

not
20

ask

any

questions

about

mitigation

of

Further, the

damages

to

David

Thurgood

or Randy

Peterson.

few questions asked by Manti's counsel to John

Call conclusively shows that Call did not aggravate the damages
either by action or inaction:
Q.

[S]o on the 23rd of March 1982, when you became
aware of the problems [Manti's breach], what did
your firm do?

A,

Well, I wrote a letter, I think to you, to
respond and indicated that the contract was
still in force.

Q.

In 1982, Mr. Call, did you provide any engineering services to anyone?

A.

Oh, sure.

Q.

So, since March 23rd of 1982, when you became
aware of the problems with the contract, your
engineering firm went forward and you continued
to do other work. . .and your revenue, ranged
from
$150,000 to over $300,000 for each of the
years since 1981.

A.

That's correct, except.
down year.

. .1982.

That was a

(Tr. of Proceedings p. 242 lines 3-9; p. 243 lines 14-19, 23.)
In short, Call continued
breach.

in business after Manti's

There is no showing that Call aggravated the damages

caused by Manti's breach, either by action or inaction.
Further, the evidence conclusively showed that Call
did not recover the lost profits, flowing from Manti's breach
in 1982.
A.

1982.

That was a down year.

Q.

Was there ever a time from 1982 to 1985 that
your firm didn't have the capacity to do Manti
project, as well as the work you were doing?
21

A.

No, We could have done that,

(Tr. p. 245 lines 13-16.)
The only other witness who testified on the mitigation of damages issue was the economic consultant. He testified
that Call's gross revenues for 1982, the year the contract was
breached, were

$314,000, but

that

Call

gross an additional $240,000 in revenue.
14.)

Of

because

course, Call

Manti

did

breached

the

not

generate

engineering

had the capacity

to

(Tr. p. 282 lines 7that

extra

service

revenue

contract.

Call's lost profits were $136,324 (Tr, p. 278, lines 208.)
In summary, mitigation of damages is an affirmative
defense.

There is nothing in the record suggesting that Call

aggravated the contract damages.

The same evidence shows that

Call did not regain the lost profits.
witnesses of its own.

Manti did not call any

There is no evidence, none, that proves

that Call failed to mitigate damages.
POINT VII

-

Manti

UNLESS CALL IS AWARDED HIS EXPERT WITNESSES FEE
COSTS, HE DOES NOT HAVE A REMEDY BY DUE COURSE
OF LAW, AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I SECTION 11 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
argues

witness fee costs.

that

prior

cases

have

denied

expert

However, not one of those cases considered

whether denying expert witness fee costs in a complex contract
case denies a plaintiff

a remedy as guaranteed by Article I

Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.
Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution guaran22

tees to citizens, including CaJLL, the following rights:
All courts shall be open, and every person
for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation shall have remedy by
due
course
of
law
which
shall
be
administered without denial. . . .
Thirty-three states have open court's constitutional
provisions similar to Utah's.
717

P.3d

670

originated

(Utah

with

the

1985).
"Magna

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
The

open

Carta."

court's

Ld. at

provisions

674.

The open

court's guarantee applies to judicial as well as legislative
action.

e.g. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky.App. 1973).

The open court's
purposes.

clauses

are designed

to accomplish

several

"The clear language of the section guarantees access

to the courts" to obtain a remedy.

Berry, at 675.

A primary

purpose of these provisions is to assail the once existing evil
of paying fines to the king and his officers for delaying or
expediting lawsuits or for obtaining justice.

Swann v. Kidd,

79 Ala. 431 (1885); or to prevent justice from being equated
with affluence.
The plain and simple fact is that although Call won
in the lower court, unless he is granted his expert witness fee
costs of $9,812.54, he is denied a remedy because his award is
eaten up by necessarily

incurred witness

fee costs.

Others

like Call will be effectively denied access to the court and a
remedy.

Justice will be equated with affluence.
Manti, in its brief, concludes that if the law (re23

garding witness fee awards) should be rewritten, this is certainly not the case for it.

Manti' s conclusion is contrary to

that of the trial court judge.
[N]ow there's a Supreme Court decision
saying I can't award expert witness fees,
and it seems to me that for me to come to a
contrary conclusion is just ridiculous.
However. . .personally, I've always felt
just like you. . .but I'm not going to rule
that way. But I put it on the record, and
you can go up and if you are arguing the
rest of it, you can argue that my personal
feeling
is expert witness
fees in a
reasonable rate ought to be allowed.
You've got my statement on the record how I
personally
feel about it.
(Emphasis
added.)
(Tr. of Proceedings March 3, 1989, pp. 32 lines 19-25; 33 line
1-)
V.
CONCLUSION
The record in this case shows that the lower court's
verdict

and

judgment must be

increased

to $56,377 or a new

trial held on the issue of Call' s damages.

The remedy shows

that the lower court:
1.

Did not follow the Utah Supreme Court's mandate;

2.

Was not directed by the Utah Supreme Court to

try any mitigation of damages affirmative defense;
3.

Prejudiced Call by allowing a pleading amendment

after the jury was impanelled;
4.

Prejudiced Call by revoking a trial continuance;

5.

Allowed Manti to present false and prejudicial
24

arguments; and
6.

Failed to instruct the jury on how to calculate

lost profits.
The record also shows there is no evidence supporting
the notion that Call did not mitigate his damages.

Further,

Call did not have notice that mitigation of damages was a
trial issue.
Finally, unless Call is granted his expert witness
costs, he is denied a judicial remedy for Manti's breach of
contract.
DATED this

day of February, 1990.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

... M/Jk
ROBERT J. DEBRY
DALE F. GARDINER
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the

day of February, 1990 I

mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing CORRECTED
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF (Call v. Manti) by depositing the same,
postage prepaid, U.S. Mail to:
Paul R. Frischknecht
Attorney for Defendant\Respondent
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642

'/fau.
SP2A-04l\jn
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PAUL R. FRISCHKNECHT
Attorney for the Plaintiff
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone:

835-4391

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN CALL ENGINEERING INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

ANSWER TO PLAINTIFFS
INTERROGATORIES

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No, 8606

MANTI CITY CORPORATION,
a Municipal Corporation,
Defendant.

Comes now the defendant by and through their counsel
and answers the Interrogatories submitted by the plaintiff
in the above entitled matter as follows:
INTERROGATORIES
1.

Describe in reasonable detail the factual basis

for your first defense, that plaintiff's complaint fails
to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
Answer: Utah Code Annotate'd, Section 63-30-1 e t .
al. denies recovery.
2.

Describe in reasonable detail the factual basis

for your second defense, that plaintiff's claim is barred
by U.C.A. 63-30-1 et. a l .
Answer: Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-1 e t .
a l . grants immunity from suit against a political subdivision.

-23.

Describe in reasoanble detail the factual basis

for your third defense, that there has been an accord and
satisfaction.
Answer: Plaintiff was paid in excess of $22,000.00
as work he performed.
4.

Describe in reasonable detail all services that

you claim plaintiff has rendered for you pursuant to the
contract attached to the complaint in this case.
Answer:

The plaintiff, John Call Engineering was

engaged by defendant Manti City Corp. to conduct a sewer
study on the installation of a sewer in Manti City.
5.

Itemize all payments you claim to have made for

the services described in Interrogatory 4 above.
Answer:
6.

See Attachment #1.

Have you employed anyone to perform services

described in the contract attached to the complaint in
this case?
Answer:
7.

Yes.

If so:

(a) —

Describe in reasonable detail the services

performed, and;
(b) —
Answer:

Itemize all payments made for those services.
Following the release of Call Engineering

by Manti City, (referenced letter from Manti City signed

-3by Paul Frischknecht, dated March 22, 1982 and letter to
Call Engineering signed by Mayor Robert Bessey dated April
23, 1982); Manti City then engaged Thurgood and Associates
to conduct a sewer study.

(See attached copies of Sewer

Contracts with Thurgood and Associates labeled descriptive
attachment for Page 6, Item 7a).
See attachment #2 —

payments made to Thurgood and

Associates.
8.

Identify every person to defendant's knowledge

who was present at the May 6, 1981 Manti City Council meeting.
Answer:

Review of the minutes of the May 6, 1981

Manti City Council meeting lists the following persons
present:
Mayor Ben Kjar; Councilman Robert Bessey; Councilman
Bryan McArthur; Councilman Lionel Kind, Councilman Stan
Voorhees, Councilman Jay Cluff and City Recorder William
A. Mickelson.

Citizens present before the discussion with

John Call, Mr. Lynn Cox, citizens present after the discussion
with John Call included Mr. Lynn Cox and Mr. Wilbur Lund.
9.

Describe in reasonable detail the following:

(a) —

The substance of all discussions at the May

6, 1981 Manti City Council meeting regarding the subject
of contracting with plaintiff;

-4(b) —

Those who took part in those discussions;

(c) —

What each person said during the discussion.

Answer:

Reference copy of minutes May 6, 1981^ copy

attached hereto.
10.

Identify any statement, conversation or other

communication,/oral or written.^between plaintiff and any
officer of defendant concerning the subject matter of the
contract attached to the complaint in this case, including:
(a) —

The time of such communication;

(b) —

The place of such communication;

(c) —

The persons present at the time and place

of such communication;
(d) —

The substance of such communication.

Answer:

Reference attached copies of written communications

and minutes of the City Council meetings of November 18,
1981, February 9, 1982, February 17, 1982 and March 3,
1982.
11.

Identify every written statement of a witness

or party about the subject matter of the contract attached
to the complaint in this case, including:
(a) —

The time such statement was made:

(b) —

The place of such statement;

(c) —

The person who took such statement;

(d) —

The substance of such statement.

-5-

Answer:

None to our knowledge, with the exception

of those in Item #10 above.
12.

Identify every document referring to or relating

to the subject matter of the contract attached to the complaint
in this case.
Answer:

Reference attached copies of the minutes,

letters and memorandums.
13.

Identify every witness you intend to call at

trial, and summarize in reasonable detail the testimony
you expect them to give.
Answer: Ben Kjar, Robert Bessey, Bryan McArthur,
Lionel King, Stan Voorhees, Jay Cluff, and William Mickelson.
Each will testify they did not read the agreement
and understood the agreement presented to them was limited
to sewer study purposes only.
14.

Identify each exhibit you intend to introduce

into evidence at trial.
Answer: Those exhibits attached to this
set of interrogatories will be introduced at trial.

If

others are determined to be used, such information will
be made known before the time of trial.
DATED this

3/

<Iay of October, 1983.

PAUL R. PRISCHKNEGHT
Attorney for the Defendant

-6MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing Interrogatories to:
Robert J. DeBry, Esq.
Attorney at Law
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
postage prepaid thereon, thisl
1983.

«^V/ /n

oa^ o^. October,

DALE F. GARDINER -A114 7
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A084 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN CALL ENGINEERING, INC., ]
a Utah corporation,
;
PRETRIAL ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 8606

MANTI CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation,

l

JUDGE DON V. TIBBS

Defendant.
IT IS ORDERED:
I.
This is an action for damages caused by defendant
Manti

City

corporation's

breach

of

an

engineering

service

contract with plaintiff John Call Engineering, Inc.

II.
POSSIBILITY OF SETTLEMENT
The parties have discussed settlement and are approximately $95,000 apart on their respective offers.

FIIF

nnpv

III.
CQKTEKTIQK OF THE PARTIES

(A)

Admitted F a c t s and I s s u e s .
(1)

This

Court

has

jurisdiction

over

the

(2)

Venue is proper;

(3)

Plaintiff is a consulting engineering firm;

(4)

Defendant is a Utah municipality;

(5)

On

parties;

or

about

May

6,

1981,

the

parties

entered into an engineering services contract for the study,
design and supervising of construction of a sewer system for
the defendant.

The contract is Exhibit 1 previously admitted

into evidence with this Court.
(6)

Plaintiff performed phase I of the contract

and presented the preliminary study report to Kanti City in
October 1981.
(7)

Defendant

paid

plaintiff

approximately

$22,000 for completing the services called for in Phase I of
the contract.
(8)

Subsequently, defendant Manti City breached

the contract PY declaring the contract null and void and by
hiring

the

engineering

firm

of Thurgood

and Associates

to

design and

supervise the construction of the sewer system,

which they did.
(9)

The cost of the completed sewer system was

$2,096,883.63.
(10) The amount paid to Thurgood and Associates
Engineering for services performed on the sewer project was
$186,400.00.
(11) Call was in compliance with the contract up
until the time Manti breached the contract.

The purpose of

this trial is to determine the amount of damages.
(12) Judgment is to be entered in favor of the
plaintiff in an amount determined by the jury.

IV.
The reservations as to the facts cited in Paragraph
III or as follows:

None.

V.
The following facts, though not admitted, are not to
be contested at the trial by evidence to the contrary:

3

None.

VI.
The following issues of fact and no other remain to
be litigated upon the trial:
a)
plaintiff

The

amount

of

damages

sustained

by

the

by reason of defendant's breach of the contract.

VII.
The exhibits to be offered at the trial, together
with a statement of all admissions, by and all issues between
the parties with respect thereto are as follows:
A)

Plaintiff's exhibits:
(1)

All trial exhibits previously admitted into
evidence by the Court, that the Court rules
are relevant to the issue of damages;

(2)

The contract entered into between Thurgood
& Associates and Manti City;

(3)

The project

time

sheets

of Thurgood

and

Associates on the sewer project;
(4)

The

project

time

summary

prepared

by

Thurgood and Associates;
(5)

Plaintiff's financial records

4

for 1981-84

and

1979-81, if plaintiff can reasonably

locate them;
(6)

Randy

Peterson's

projection

of

gross

receipts that would have been paid to Call
pursuant to the contracts;
(7)

Thurgood and Associates's invoices to Manti
City for the sewer project;

(8)

Plaintiff's calculations as to the amount
of

net

profits

plaintiff

would

have

received on the contract;
(9) An updated lost profits analysis performed
by Frank Stuart and Associates.
Defendant
paragraphs

has no objection to exhibits identified in

(1)/ (2), (3), and (4), above and stipulate that

they may be admitted into evidence.

Defendant reserves his

objections to exhibits 5-9 above.
(B)

Defendant's

exhibits:

Defendant

does

not

anticipate using any exhibits other than pliantiff's exhibits
identified above.

VIII.
The following issues of law, and no other, remain to
be litigated upon the trial.

(A)

The

formula

to

be used

in measuring

Call's

damages.

IX.
jury
This matter is set for/»trial on Thursday, January 12,
1989, at 10:00 a.m.

Estimated time of trial is two days.

X.
WITNESSES
Plaintiff will call as witnesses:
John Call
Chuck Peterson
David Thurgood
Randy Peterson
Plaintiff may call as witnesses:
Frank Stuart
Brandon Tuttle
Rebuttal witnesses if needed and not anticipated
at this time.
Defendant will call as witnesses:
David Thurgood, and rebuttal witnesses as needed
and not anticipated at this time.
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XI.
Discovery is complete.

XII.
The

foregoing

admissions

have

been

made

by

the

parties, and the parties having specified the foregoing issues
of fact and law remaining to be litigated, this order shall
supplement the pleadings and govern the Court of this case,
unless modified to prevent manifest injustice.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES

Bv
PAUL FREISCHNECHT
Attorney for Defendant

7

jfltb^MjU*
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing

PRETRIAL

ORDER

(John Call Engineering,

Manti City Corporation) , was mailed this

Inc., vs.

/flflday of January,

1989, by depositing same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to
the following:
PAUL R. FRISCHKNECHT
Attorney for the Defendant
50 North Main Street
Manti, Utah 84642

.'/^i/nc/a J
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